Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin passed away at 96, now compounding the Party’s dilemma over what to do about the protests. Although President Jiang was not considered a terribly well-loved leader, the passing of a former Party leader gives an opportunity for the protestors to come together to mourn and compare Jiang’s rule with Xi’s today. And the results are not kind to Xi.
For all the scorn the international media held towards President Jiang (ruling China from 1993 to 2003), let’s face it - he was a pretty smart fellow. In the “60 Minutes” interview below, he takes on some pretty tough and direct questions from 60 Minutes interviewer Bob Anderson. Bob Anderson’s tone is actually quite arrogant when looked at from today’s perspective - at times he takes the tone of a teacher scolding a schoolboy - but the fact President Jiang was able to manage intense questioning with such deft charm shows just how intelligent and crafty a man Jiang was.
The protests are continuing but at a more subdued pace so far, with the actual documentation and dissemination of protests increasingly becoming an online battle with censors. Government censors are going full-throttle on Chinese social media such as Weibo and Tiktok, forcing Chinese citizens to send their videos to western social media like Twitter. One Twitter account from a Chinese protestor based in Italy has over 700,000 followers and has reportedly been receiving 12 messages a second to document protests. Documenting protests is compelling more Chinese to protest in response, fueling the anti-Party fervor.
[protests in Tokyo]
As a response, pro-Beijing accounts now beginning to post lewd photos and videos with the same hashtags as a way to “dilute” the legitimate anti-Party content being posted. While some reports suggest the censors are being overloaded, the fact that so many people don’t really know what’s going on in China suggests they are still able to do a fairly good job.
Beijing still is struggling to come up with a coherent response. We can see this clearly with the incident that occurred on Tuesday with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhao Lijian. Zhao is a generally provocative official who has gotten into very public fights with U.S. officials over U.S. policy, U.S.-China relations, and racism in the U.S. But when asked if China would end its zero-covid policy in front of foreign reporters at a news conference, he was embarrassingly caught speechless.
Increasingly, it seems the government is attempting to brand protests as the work of “criminals” and “enemies of the state” that “need to be countered.” These are isolated incidents, according to this narrative, that must be countered with force in order to preserve stability for the “rest of the law-abiding people.”
Likewise, Beijing is likely categorizing protests into different categories, letting small-scale protests run to a boil but not needing strong countermeasures. Larger-scale protests, however, will likely be targeted for a heavier blow in the coming days and weeks if they continue.
Along this vein, China’s domestic security chief made a recent statement saying yesterday the government will “resolutely strike hard against infiltrators and sabotage activities conducted by hostile forces.” This is the first official language we’ve seen from the Party about the protests. His words have been backed up by concrete action: we see tanks being sent through Beijing streets. While no large-scale violence has occurred yet, this is likely to change in the days and weeks ahead if protests don’t abate.
At the same time, it’s very likely the Party will adjust its strict covid policy in the days and weeks ahead. There was a recording made that was posted on WeChat between local government workers (seemingly from Sichuan Province) that the central government is drafting plans for rolling out an experimental policy that will allow certain areas to open up once they achieve a certain level of immunity.
We also see official language coming out from China’s National Health Commission suggesting that “with the weakening of the Omicron virus, the popularization of vaccination, and the accumulation of experience in covid prevention and control, China is facing a new covid situation.” This suggests changes to zero covid are in the works and may be disseminated soon.
So while authorities may look like they are readying for battle, real change could be underway. Enacting violent countermeasures and striking down protestors hard like what we say in 1989 would enact a massive blow to China’s standing in the world as well as its trading relationships. International companies such as Apple may have no choice but to shift supply chains to other countries or face criticism at home for cozying up to human rights abuses. And because China’s economy is doing so poorly, the country cannot afford another blow to its development goals, particularly after the U.S. restricted its chip sales. So a violent response is not optimal for the Party, and there certainly must be a growing chorus of voices against this option in Beijing.
The best outcome for the government that both saves face but also reacts to people’s concerns is to use heavy language in dissuading further protests but then a light touch in opening up select areas on a gradual basis. By tactfully agreeing to adjust their covid policy while also boldly reasserting their authority, this could give the CCP a face-saving way out of their predicament. But they will have to show restraint when dealing with larger-scale protests which may re-emerge in the coming weeks, i.e. showing tanks but not firing on protestors.
The key question is, with so much disgust being hurled at the Party, with so many people showing their dissatisfaction with President Xi, can we all really go back to the status quo? Will people just go back to work and willingly be led by a Party that they just cursed at the week before? Will President Xi still be able to rule with such an iron fist within the Party bureaucracy, with everyone around him clearly knowing just how unpopular he really is around the country?
I’m not sure.
These are questions that we will certainly get more clarity on in the weeks ahead.
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